

# Old Boys' Clubs and Upward Mobility Among the Educational Elite

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# Valerie Michelman



- PhD candidate at the Harris School
- On the job market this year
- JMP: **“Sex, Drugs, and R&D: Missing Innovation from Regulating Female Enrollment in Clinical Trials”**
- <https://sites.google.com/view/valeriemichelman/home>



# Motivation

We take on two questions:

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e.g. Weber 1922; Mills 1956; Bordieu 1998; Bol and Weeden 2015
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This paper: evidence from Harvard undergrads in “Greatest Generation” cohorts

- ▶ Important, because we rely on universities to provide paths to upward mobility  
e.g. Zimmerman 2019; Chetty et al. 2020
- ▶ Convenient, because lives of Harvard students are richly, publicly documented

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  - ▶ Room randomization design generating systematic variation in peer attributes

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- ▶ Two complementary research designs
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  - ▶ Room randomization design generating systematic variation in peer attributes
- ▶ Extend descriptive analysis across 20th century

## Three facts about Harvard in the early 20th century

*Snobbish separation of the students on lines of wealth [...] would destroy the chief value of the College as a place for the training of character.*

– Harvard President Lawrence Lowell, 1902

1. Central goal of Harvard admins: on-campus interaction between economically diverse students
2. Students compete for membership in exclusive social groups known as **final clubs**
3. Important determinant of social status: whether you went to **private feeder school**



# Academic, social, and career outcomes for 1919-1935 entering classes

## 1. Harvard Archives

- ▶ In school: high school background, social activities, grades
- ▶ Long run: detailed biographical accounts 25 years later

Figure: Freshman year




Figure: Senior year





Figure: 25 years later



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## 2. US Census 1910-1940

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


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



Figure: 25 years later



# Few low-SES or high achievers at the top of the social ladder

**All students**



**Selective final clubs**




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Private feeder share	24%	73%
Public feeder share	23%	1.2%
Jewish name share	7%	0%
High grades share	24%	9%

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Social success > academic success



# Social success > academic success



- ▶ Weak relationship between grades, income
- ▶ Selective final club members earn 32% more than non-members

Points with  $N < 20$  not displayed. Top two groups are pooled.

# Social success → other adult outcomes



Source: 25th Reunion class reports. Points with  $N < 20$  not displayed. Top two groups are pooled.

# Social success premium persists within HS, legacy status, family

- ▶ What about **selection**?
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  - ▶ HS type
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- ▶ **Membership premium persists through everything we try**
- ▶ Final club premium **does not** reflect selection on family, social engagement
  - ▶ Does not rule out selection within families; e.g. on social skill

# High-status peers → high-stakes outcomes?

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- ▶ Descriptive evidence suggests they may
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Approach: use random residential assignment

- ▶ Tests the general proposition that social interactions at college matter
- ▶ Evaluates actual policy Harvard used to promote cross-group interactions

# Room randomization and residential integration

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- ▶ Assignment process:
  - ▶ Students fill out application blanks indicating **occupancy** and **price**
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  - ▶ It really seems to have been random **(More)** ✓
  - ▶ “MTO on campus” : High-priced neighborhoods  $\Rightarrow$  high-status peers ✓  
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
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**(More 1) (More 2)**
- ▶ Hard to combine w/ Census data due to sample size limits

## Higher-status peers $\rightarrow$ more social success

$$\underbrace{Y_i}_{\text{College social outcomes}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \underbrace{RP_{p(i)}}_{\text{nbd price rank}} + \underbrace{\theta_{r(i)} + \tau_{h(i)}}_{\text{block and HS FEs}} + e_i \quad (1)$$

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
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
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
- ▶ High status peers → first-year activities, leadership, final clubs
- ▶ But only for private HS students
- ▶ 50 pp peer rank change →
  - ▶ activity count ↑ 19%
  - ▶ freshman leadership ↑ 35-50%
  - ▶ **final club** membership ↑ 38%

Higher-status peers → bigger gaps in adult social outcomes

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
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


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- ▶ High-status peers push students towards adult social clubs
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- ▶ 50 pp rank change → social clubs ↑ 26%


## Higher-status peers → more segregated career paths

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
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
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
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
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- ▶ 50 pp peer rank change → 40% increase in finance

# Summary

1. High achievers, low-SES students  $\sim$  completely absent from old boys' clubs
2. Social success premium = high, academic success premium = low
3. Exposure to high-status peers  $\rightarrow$ 
  - ▶ Increased chance of joining exclusive social groups;
  - ▶ Long run shifts in career and social outcomes...... but tends to **further segregate** these groups



# Summary



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- 
- ▶ **Social interactions shaped access to post-war economic elite, but did not provide a path for underrepresented groups**

# How much have things changed?

- ▶ Harvard has changed a lot since the 1930s
- ▶ Has “old boys’ club” dynamic changed?
  - ▶ Who joins?
  - ▶ Relationship to career outcomes?
- ▶ Extend descriptive analysis through present
- ▶ Focus on A.D. club— have membership data over full period



# How much have things changed?

## ► Result 1: Harvard diversifies, but A.D. club does not




# How much have things changed?

## ► Result 2: the “social path” to finance still exists



# How much have things changed?

- Result 3: at Ivy+ universities, children from richest families earn more than others



Data from Chetty et al. (2020) on age 32-34 earnings outcomes for Ivy+ students in 1980-82 birth cohorts.

# How should this change my mind?

## 1. College peer effects matter in the long run.

- ▶ Many papers show short-run impacts of college peers; we **elevate** this.  
Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman 2003; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner 2006; ...; Jones & Kofoed 2020
- ▶ Finance literature shows college networks matter; we show access is unequal  
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## 2. Social component of elite higher education is key.

- ▶ Social path to post-war elite unavailable to lower-status students, religious minorities  
Abramitzky et al. 2014, 2020; Baltzell 1964; Zweigenhaft & Domhoff 1982; Davidson et al. 1995
- ▶ Much econ work on academic mismatch; may want to think about **social** mismatch  
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
## 3. Social cohesion is hard to build when the stakes are high.

- ▶ “Contact hypothesis”: cooperative intergroup interactions → social cohesion
- ▶ Borne out in low- or medium-stakes settings  
Rao 2019; Carrell et al. 2019; Lowe 2020; Mousa 2020
- ▶ May be harder to do in **high-stakes** settings



## Counts by high school


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
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# Room randomization and residential integration



(a) Rooms by price per student





(b) Neighborhoods by mean price per student



# Room and neighborhood characteristics





# Peer neighborhood characteristics



(Back)

# Wide variation in peer group attributes within randomization block

- 24% of nbd price variation; 68% of private feeder share variation are within-block



(Back)


## Randomization → balance on observables

$$\underbrace{Y_i}_{\text{Own attributes}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \underbrace{RP_{p(i)}}_{\text{nbd price rank}} + e_i \quad (1)$$

(Back)

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
\* Outcome is standardized

- Students in high-price nbds come from high-status backgrounds

(Back)

# Randomization → balance on observables

$$\underbrace{Y_i}_{\text{Own attributes}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \underbrace{RP_{p(i)}}_{\text{nbd price rank}} + \underbrace{\theta_{r(i)} + \tau_{h(i)}}_{\text{block and HS FEs}} + e_i \quad (1)$$



\* Outcome is standardized

- ▶ Students in high-price nbds come from high-status backgrounds
- ▶ Adding controls for occupancy and own-room price kills this relationship

(Back)




Higher priced peer neighborhood  $\rightarrow$  higher status peers

$$\underbrace{Y_i}_{\text{Peer attributes}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \underbrace{RP_{p(i)}}_{\text{nbd price rank}} + e_i \quad (2)$$

(Back)

## Higher priced peer neighborhood → higher status peers


$$\underbrace{Y_i}_{\text{Peer attributes}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \underbrace{RP_{p(i)}}_{\text{nbd price rank}} + e_i \quad (2)$$



(Back)

## Higher priced peer neighborhood → higher status peers

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- ▶ 50 percentile ↑ in nbd price rank →
  - ▶ Peer priv. feeder share ↑ 10pp (40%)
  - ▶ Peer legacy share ↑ 3.2pp (44%)
  - ▶ Peer immigrant share ↓ 2.3pp (24%)


(Back)

## Higher-status peers $\rightarrow$ similar academic outcomes

$$\underbrace{Y_i}_{\text{Academic outcomes}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \underbrace{RP_{p(i)}}_{\text{nbd price rank}} + \underbrace{\theta_{r(i)} + \tau_{h(i)}}_{\text{block and HS FEs}} + e_i \quad (2)$$

## Higher-status peers → similar academic outcomes


$$\underbrace{Y_i}_{\text{Academic outcomes}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \underbrace{RP_{p(i)}}_{\text{nbd price rank}} + \underbrace{\theta_{r(i)} + \tau_{h(i)}}_{\text{block and HS FEs}} + e_i \quad (2)$$



- ▶ No effect on academic rank group
- ▶ Some effect on having a rank group → not failing or incomplete

## Higher-status peers → similar academic outcomes

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- ▶ No effect on academic rank group
- ▶ Some effect on having a rank group → not failing or incomplete
- ▶ Effects similar by HS type