

**The Personalization Services Firm:
What to Sell, Whom to Sell to and For How Much?***

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Abstract

Personalization services such as individual-specific advertising and couponing are a growth market. Some personalization service firms offer their services on an exclusive basis to manufacturers in a product category while others offer it on a non-exclusive basis. Some restrict the length of purchase history data used for personalization, while others use very long purchase histories. Despite these differences, there is little empirical guidance on what is the optimal business strategy for a particular firm.

This paper fills this void by offering an empirical framework to help a personalization services firm choose the right strategy. It also enables the firm to identify new types of future competitors. We illustrate the approach in the context of a personalized coupon vendor in grocery retailing. We find that personalization using the maximum available purchase history data on a non-exclusive basis is the most profitable strategy for the vendor.

We also evaluate the possibility of a grocery retailer using consumer information from its loyalty card programs to offer these personalized coupon services. We find that since personalization improves the retailer's profits due to the sale of groceries, the retailer can use this profit increase to subsidize the sale of personalized coupon services. Therefore retailers may be the most potent competitive threat to personalized coupon vendors in grocery retailing.

Keywords: Personalization Service, One-to-One Marketing, Targeted Coupons, Competition, Marketing Channels, Information Supplier.

1. Introduction

1.1 The Personalization Services Industry

Personalized marketing targeted at individual consumers (a.k.a. one-to-one marketing) has been on the rise over the last two decades (Peppers and Rogers 1997). A number of vendors now specialize in offering personalized communication and promotion services to consumer marketers to help these firms improve the efficiency of their advertising and promotion dollars. Table 1 lists some of the major players in the personalization services business. For each of these players, we provide a brief description of their business and report their revenues, market capitalization and growth rates. As can be seen from Table 1, the industry is gaining in importance as reflected in its market valuations as well as revenues and growth rates. Several companies in this industry have revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars and valuations over a billion dollars.

**** Insert Table 1 here****

The use of scanners in offline retailing and the intrinsic digital nature of online retailing have enabled the easy collection of purchase history data. The falling costs of digital storage and computation have made the recording and analysis of vast amounts of purchase history data for personalization purposes feasible. In the grocery and drugstore markets, Catalina Marketing obtains purchase history data through cooperating retailers and provides targeted coupons on behalf of both grocery manufacturers and retailers to households purchasing at that particular retailer. Catalina Marketing has penetrated about 21,000 of the roughly 34,000 supermarkets in the United States and records about 250 million transactions per week, which is then used to aid manufacturers for targeting. Such targeted marketing considerably enhance response rates and therefore enhances the efficiency of the marketing programs. For example Catalina's response rates are estimated to be around 6-9% compared to the 1-2% response rates for coupons in mass-mailed free standing inserts (FSI). On the Internet, companies such as DoubleClick collect past visit data from cooperating websites and use these to deliver targeted advertising for its advertising clients.

In the catalog and specialty retailing industry, firms such as Abacus B2C Alliance and I-Behavior pool transactional data from over a thousand catalog titles/retailers to offer improved

targeted direct marketing services to its members. While Abacus collects data only at the catalog level, firms such as I-Behavior collect data at the SKU level. The Abacus B2C Alliance has 1550 catalogs/retailers who have pooled together data on over 4.4 billion transactions from over 90 million households (Miller 2003). I-Behavior has data on over 1000 mid-sized catalog companies on over 103 million consumers from 89 million households.

Advances in data collection and storage technologies will continue to fuel the growth and scale of personalization services firms. Further, advances in promotion delivery technologies to individuals (in-store at the point of purchase; at home through direct mail; online through email; and even by wireless through cell-phones when on the move) increases the effectiveness and timeliness of personalized marketing strategies. Not surprisingly, personalized advertising and promotions are pervasive in a wide range of industries including services such as banking, telephony, insurance, durable goods such as autos, and the vast range of products sold in supermarkets and drugs stores. But despite their growing economic importance, there is very little empirical research addressing issues of concern to this industry.

1.2 The Research Problem

Much of the extant research on this industry to-date has been of the “engineering” type. The “engineering” type research focuses on how firms should use data about households to better personalize the advertising or price promotion. This research has occurred in marketing, information systems and computer science. (Ansari and Mela 2003, Liu and Shih 2005, Adomavicius et al. 2005). Researchers often position these as approaches by which a firm can take advantage of its internal databases to improve its marketing effectiveness. Equivalently, from the point of view of the personalization services industry, this research leads to technologies that facilitate creation of the “products” they offer to their markets. In contrast to such “engineering” research, our goal in this paper is to help personalization services firms answer questions of a “marketing” nature, i.e., once the technology is available, what features the product should have, who it should be sold to and at what price.

1.2.1 Diversity of Strategies in Practice: Are Current Strategies Optimal?

In practice, personalization services firms offer targeting services to their client on both an exclusive basis as well as a non-exclusive basis. For example, Catalina divides a year into four thirteen-week periods and divides the United States into several regions in defining the product. Within any particular time period and region, it offers the targeting service on an

exclusive basis to manufacturers within a particular product category. Catalina divides the market into hundreds of finely defined categories (currently over 500 categories). In contrast, targeting service providers in the catalog and specialty retailing arena such as Abacus and i-Behavior offer their targeting services on a non-exclusive basis. They sell to any catalog marketer or specialty retailer who requests their services.

These providers also differ in their outlook toward increasing the accuracy of their targeting services. Catalina's offers two types of targeting services: (1) Checkout Coupon[®], based on last purchase data and (2) Checkout Direct[®] based on 65 weeks of purchase history data. It voluntarily does not use data beyond 65 weeks. Catalina originally decided on the 65 week limit nearly two decades ago, when storage was considerably more expensive. In such an environment, it makes sense to destroy older data, if more recent data are better predictors of consumer behavior. However, in many infrequently purchased categories, one would expect that using data beyond the last 65 weeks can help improve the accuracy of targeting considerably. Further as data storage costs have fallen, it may make sense to revisit the limit on data used for targeting. The 65 week limit is also theoretically puzzling because Catalina uses an exclusive client strategy, where increasing accuracy should always improve profitability for the client and therefore the price that Catalina can charge for the service. Absent the threat of downstream competition, increasing accuracy should be profitable unless the cost of storage relative to the gains is prohibitively expensive.

In contrast to Catalina, a company such as Abacus continues to expand the accuracy of its database. Abacus pools data from over 1550 catalog marketers/specialty retailers on over 90 million households and continue to expand the depth of purchase information about households in its database. Abacus uses data for up to 5 years on each household in their database. When DoubleClick purchased Abacus in 1999, it sought to combine the offline data from Abacus with online transaction behavior captured by DoubleClick. DoubleClick however did not combine their offline and online data because privacy advocates vehemently opposed the idea and it created a public relations problem for Catalina.

Despite the diversity in the practices of firms about "Whom to sell" (Should we sell exclusively or non-exclusively?) and "What to sell" ("Should we limit the depth of the data used for targeting?"), there is little research to guide personalization service firms on what the optimal strategy should be. Are the existing strategies used by firms optimal? Or could they improve by

shifting to a different marketing strategy? As storage costs fall, the economics of using longer histories can change. Can personalization services firms benefit from increasing the extent of purchase history it uses for targeting? Should they reevaluate their policies of offering exclusive/non-exclusive contracts to firms in a category and allow multiple firms?

The timeliness of this research is highlighted in a recent stock analysis report about Catalina by Deutsche Bank (Ginocchio et al 2005) which states: “Categories are sold on four thirteen-week cycles with exclusivity (only one manufacturer can promote that category during that period). As Catalina believes that only approximately 20-25% of its customers want exclusivity, they are looking at ways to potentially sell more than one manufacturer in a category.” Using our analytical approach, Catalina will have an empirical basis to answer this critical business issue that they currently face.

1.2.2 The “What to Sell”, “Whom to Sell to” and “For How Much” Questions

To fix ideas and to facilitate empirical work, we illustrate the research problem that we address in the context of Catalina, a firm which sells personalized coupon services to grocery manufacturers using purchase history data of households from cooperating retailers.

Consider the following “simple” question facing Catalina’s management: What *price* should Catalina charge for its service from a grocery manufacturer such as Heinz for issuing targeted coupons on its behalf in the ketchup category to households? Naturally, the price should depend on the economic value (i.e., the incremental profits), that Heinz would obtain from using the targeting service. What would that economic value be? For most standard products and services, the economic value of a product to a customer is independent of who else uses it. But for targeting services, the economic value of the service to Heinz would depend on whether Heinz alone uses the service or whether its competitor Hunt’s also uses the service at the same time, because the effectiveness of targeting is a function of whether one’s competitor also targets.

If the economic value to Heinz (and therefore prices) depends on who else Catalina sells the service to, the pricing question is linked to the “Whom to Sell to” question. This is particularly interesting because the economic value of the service for Heinz may be higher or lower if Hunt’s also uses the service; i.e., this service can have positive or negative externalities. If the service has positive externalities, it makes obvious sense for the firm to sell its service to both Heinz and Hunt’s. If it has negative externalities, then Catalina would have to evaluate

whether the negative externalities for Heinz and Hunt's is sufficiently low to still sell to both Heinz and Hunt's; if not, it would have to sell the service on an exclusive basis to either Heinz or Hunt's depending on who would have the higher willingness to pay (higher economic value). Thus the decision about whether to sell on an "exclusive" basis to one manufacturer or on a "non-exclusive" basis to multiple manufacturers is an empirical question for Catalina. Further, the "whom to sell to" question is intertwined with the "What price to charge" question.

Thus far in this scenario, we have treated the quality of the targeting service that Catalina offers as fixed. We treat the quality of the targeting service as the accuracy with which it can help a firm such as Heinz to identify the segment that Heinz seeks to target. Catalina can increase the accuracy of its targeting service in a number of ways: (1) use demographic information; (2) increase the length of purchase history of households within a category at a cooperating retailer; (3) use information about purchasing behavior in other categories at the cooperating retailer; and (4) combine information about purchasing behavior of households from other retailers.

Demographic information has been shown to be of limited use in predicting consumer preferences for grocery products (e.g., Rossi, McCulloch and Allenby 1996). Increasing length of purchase history should work in most categories where there are stable preferences. However increasing purchase history length may become less useful if consumer preferences change over time. As an obvious example, lengthening purchase histories to improve accuracy can be counter-productive in categories like diapers where purchases in the category tend to be for a limited duration. Recently there has been interest in cross-selling products and a number of multi-category studies have shown that certain characteristics such as price and feature sensitivity may be correlated across categories (Ainslie and Rossi 1998). Clearly, household purchases across retailers can be useful in improving accuracy, but Catalina does not have this option because it is contractually obliged not to pool information across retailers that cooperate with it in providing purchase history data.¹ Thus the most promising means by which Catalina can improve its accuracy in most categories is by lengthening the purchase history which it uses to target. For the purposes of analysis this paper, we will restrict ourselves to using purchase history data within the targeted category of interest at the focal retailer.

¹ Households are identified only by a retailer's internal identification number (say from a loyalty program) and therefore it is impossible for Catalina to pool information across multiple retailers.

If we relax the assumption that targeting accuracy is fixed, Catalina needs to decide on the quality of its service, i.e., how accurate its targeting service should be. This we call the “What to sell” question. For most products/services, firms would like to maximize the quality of their products/services if increasing quality were relatively costless. However, targeting services are different in that increasing the quality of the service may reduce the economic value of the service for the downstream clients. The idea is simple: if the targeting service is sold on an exclusive basis to only Heinz, the economic value of the targeting service for Heinz will definitely increase because Heinz can more effectively price discriminate its customers. But if the targeting service is sold to both Heinz and Hunt’s, the price discrimination effect of targeting can be overwhelmed by the more intense competition created by targeting (e.g., Shaffer and Zhang 1995). Whether the price discrimination effect or competition effect dominates is moderated by the level of targeting accuracy (Chen, Narasimhan and Zhang 2001). At low levels of accuracy, price discrimination effects dominate competition effects. But at high levels of accuracy the competition effect dominate price discrimination effects. Thus Catalina could potentially destroy economic value to downstream clients by increasing accuracy if it sold the product on a non-exclusive basis to both Heinz and Hunt’s. Catalina may find it worthwhile to increase accuracy and sell on an exclusive basis to Heinz or Hunt’s to reduce the effects of competition. Alternatively, it may reduce accuracy and sell to both Heinz and Hunt’s and extract greater total revenues from both. It is also important to note that many theoretical papers have restricted themselves to allowing for household heterogeneity only on horizontal attributes. In reality, households are not only heterogeneous on horizontal attributes, but also on vertical attributes. Hence it is possible that some of the theoretical insights may not carry over in real markets. An empirical analysis that uses flexible models of consumer behavior that are appropriate for a particular context is important to address the strategy questions of a particular firm.

Theoretically, therefore the “What to sell” question is intertwined with the “Whom to sell” question and the “For how much” question for targeting services. The goal of this paper is to offer an empirical approach to help a personalization services firm such as Catalina arrive at an optimal answer to these questions.

While the details of the empirical modeling in this paper will be tailored to the environment in which Catalina operates, the general approach we develop to address the research

questions can be applied in other empirical contexts with appropriate modifications for the specific characteristics of that context. For example, the framework can be used to help whether DoubleClick should sell its targeted advertising services on an exclusive basis or a non-exclusive basis. Here we will need to calibrate the impact of advertising (as opposed to couponing) on the downstream firms' profitability, but the rest of the analysis would be similar.

1.2.3 The Retailer as a Competitor to Catalina

Catalina uses purchase history data of retailers in offering targeted couponing services. A natural question that arises is: What if the retailer decides to offer targeted couponing services to manufacturers? Retailers have an advantage over Catalina in that targeting can also help improve retail profitability. Hence unlike Catalina, a retailer can potentially trade off improved retail profitability through targeted couponing against potential revenues from manufacturers such as Heinz and Hunt's through the sale of personalization services. This could imply that retailers may subsidize personalization services in order to get higher profits from the sale of goods.

Large retailers with the appropriate infrastructure could easily implement such a targeting solution. In fact, Tesco in the U.K. has been successfully collaborating with dunnhumby, a U.K. based firm in the development of personalized marketing services that includes targeted couponing over the last decade (Humby 2004, Humby et al 2003). In the U.S., dunnhumbyUSA is a joint venture between Kroger and dunnhumby that seeks to replicate dunnhumby's success in the U.K. with Tesco.

We therefore also address the triple questions of "Whom to Sell to," "What to Sell" and "For how much?" from a retailer's point of view. We measure the potential improvement in profits from the sales of goods for the retailer, relative to the improvement in profits from targeting for the manufacturers to assess the level of potential subsidy that retailers may be able to provide manufacturers in offering targeting services.

1.3 Related Research

This paper is related to both theoretical and empirical research streams on personalization. In terms of theoretical research, Shaffer and Zhang (1995) first questioned the profitability of targeted promotions in a competitive environment. They demonstrated that targeted pricing in a competitive environment leads to lower profits relative to uniform pricing. They assumed symmetric firms. Relaxing the symmetry assumption, Shaffer and Zhang (2002) show that in the presence of asymmetry, higher quality firms with larger market shares can

improve profits due to gains in market share even though they may lose profit margins due to increased competition. Thus, all the above papers show that price margins suffer due to increased competition from targeting, though Shaffer and Zhang (2002) show that with asymmetry the larger firm may still make greater profits due to higher volumes. As we discussed earlier, Chen et al. (2001) demonstrated that the level of targeting accuracy is a moderating variable in assessing the profitability of personalized promotions. There is an inverted-U shaped relationship between profitability and accuracy of targeting (personalization).

There is also a growing literature on behavior based pricing, which discusses whether a firm should use a consumer's past purchases behavior to offer promotions to one's own customers or those of its competitors (e.g., Villas-Boas 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole 2000; Shaffer and Zhang 2000). Essentially these papers also find that behavior based targeted pricing also leads to a prisoner's dilemma.

In terms of empirical research on personalized pricing, Rossi et al. (1996) and Besanko et al. (2003) evaluate the profitability of targeted coupons. In a seminal paper, Rossi et al. (1996) investigate how manufacturers can improve their profits with different levels of consumer purchase history and demographic information. Unlike this paper, they do not model the retailer or competition between manufacturers. Besanko et al. (2003) only study the profitability of targeting using only last visit data, but models both competition and the retailer. However, unlike this paper, neither of the above papers investigates the personalization service provider's strategic decisions. Our analysis also finds that these two papers over-estimate the profitability impact of personalization. This is because the models of consumer behavior used in computing profits with and without targeting are different. We discuss this issue in detail in Section 4.2.1. In terms of personalized advertising/communication, Ansari and Mela (2003) develop algorithms for how a firm should use consumer history to customize email communications.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the model and the solution strategy. Section 3 describes the data and the estimation results. Section 4 answers the questions about the personalization vendor's strategy. Section 5 investigates the impact of personalized promotions from the perspective of the retailer. Section 6 concludes.

2. The Model of the Personalization Services Market

Figure 1 represents a schematic of the grocery markets in which Catalina operates. There are four sets of agents involved in this market: (1) The personalized coupon service provider (Catalina) (2) the manufacturers (3) a retailer and (4) consumers.

*** Insert Figure 1***

The model of manufacturers selling through a retailer to the consumer has been studied in previous research (e.g., Sudhir 2001, Berto Villas-Boas 2004). In these models the pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers are modeled as endogenous. The model in this paper expands on this literature by endogenously modeling the decisions faced by a personalization coupon provider who facilitates targeted couponing to consumers in the market. Since Catalina is contractually obliged not to pool purchase history data across multiple retailers, the assumption that Catalina uses only data from one retailer for its targeting service is consistent with institutional reality. As in most previous research (e.g, Besanko et al. 1998, 2003; Sudhir 2001), we assume that the retailer is a local monopolist. Berto Villas-Boas (2004) indeed finds very little evidence for cross-retailer competition at the single category level.

Figure 2 represents the schematic of the decision alternatives faced by a personalization services provider (PSP) such as Catalina regarding the sales of its personalization services. We model the timing of the game into two phases: Phase 1 which involves the *sale of personalization services* and Phase 2 which involves the *sale of consumer goods*. Below we describe the different stages of the Phase 1 decision related to the sale of targeting services.

*** Insert Figure 2***

Phase 1: Sale of Personalization Services

Stage 1: Catalina's What to Sell Decision: At this stage, Catalina decides on the length of purchase history it should optimally use for targeting. Here we consider three alternatives: (1) Last Visit, along the lines of targeting used in Besanko et al. (2003), (2) Last Purchase, as used by Catalina in its Catalina Coupon[®] program and (3) Full Purchase History, along the lines of what Catalina uses in its Catalina Direct[®] program.²

Stage 2: Catalina's Initial "Whom to Offer to" and "At What Price" Decision: For ease of exposition, we will consider a market with two national brand manufacturers. Catalina has three alternatives to make initial offers at this stage: (1) Offer the targeting service to Firm 1 and set its

² Catalina restricts the full purchase history to only 65 weeks, but we will evaluate different lengths of purchase history.

price (p_1^f); (2) Offer the targeting service to Firm 2 and set the price (p_2^f); and (3) Offer the targeting service to *both firms* and set the prices to both firms (p_1^b, p_2^b).

The subscripts “1” and “2” on prices refer to the price charged to firms 1 and 2. The superscript ‘ f ’ refers to the fact that firm 1 or 2 is ‘first’ offered the service exclusively. The superscript ‘ b ’ refers to the situation when both firms are initially offered the service on a non-exclusive basis.

Stage 3: Initial Offer Acceptance/Rejection by Manufacturers: Manufacturers decide whether to accept or reject the offer of targeting services at the offered prices. In the case where one firm is exclusively offered and accepts the offer, the manufacturers and retailers then move to the second “sales of goods” phase with one of the firms having the capability to target. If both firms were offered initially, then there are four possible outcomes: where one of the firms accepts, both accept and neither accept. Given these outcomes, the manufacturers and retailers then move to the sales of goods phase with the firms that have accepted the targeting offers having the capability to target.

Stage 4: Catalina offers Service to “Other” Manufacturer at Second Offer Price: If one firm is exclusively offered the service first and rejects it, then Catalina will offer the service second to the other firm on an exclusive basis. For example, if Firm 2 receives the offer after Firm 1 rejects the initial offer of exclusive service, this price to firm 2 will be denoted as (p_2^s), where the superscript ‘ s ’ indicates the firm 2 was offered the service second after firm 1 refused.

Stage 5: Second Offer Acceptance/Rejection by Manufacturers: Manufacturers who received the second offer can either accept or reject the offer for the targeting service.

Given this decision, the manufacturers and retailers then move to the second phases (sales of goods) with the firms that have accepted the targeting offers having the capability to target. The payoffs realized after the second phase are shown in three rows in Figure 2. We denote the profits from the sale of goods to manufacturer ‘ f ’ by Π_f^{xy} , where x and y refers to the personalization service purchase decisions of firms 1 and 2 respectively. A value of 1 (0) refers to whether the firm uses (does not use) the personalization services. The first row indicates the payoff to the personalization provider (i.e., price charged for personalization services), the second and third rows indicate the payoffs to Firms 1 and 2 respectively which shows the net profits from the sale of goods and the fees paid (if any) to the personalization service provider.

It is important to note that in this game of complete information, Stage 4 and Stage 5 are in the off-equilibrium path, because Catalina will offer the right price in the initial offer so that whoever is offered initially will accept. We have marked the equilibrium paths in bold. Hence, even though there are 10 payoff matrices shown, the only relevant payoffs in equilibrium are the three payoff matrices where the firms that are initially offered the targeting service by Catalina accept the product. Nevertheless, the payoffs from the off-equilibrium paths are critically important for Catalina to figure out what price it should charge the firms in Stage 2. This is because Catalina's offer price to the firms should take into account the incremental profits a firm will make relative to the outcome where the competitor obtains exclusive use of personalization services. It should be noted that the price charged is not with respect to the situation where there is no targeting at all. This is because the scenario where neither firm purchases personalized coupons will not be on the sub-game perfect equilibrium path and therefore is not a credible alternative threat to either firm 1 or firm 2. This limits the amount of value that can be extracted from either firm by the personalization service provider. Hence $P_1^f = \Pi_1^{10} - \Pi_1^{01}$; $P_2^f = \Pi_2^{01} - \Pi_2^{10}$ and $P_1^b = \Pi_1^{11} - \Pi_1^{01}$; $P_2^b = \Pi_2^{01} - \Pi_2^{10}$.

Phase 2: Sales of Goods

Stage 1: Manufacturer: Manufacturers set wholesale prices and the coupon face values for individual households. If they have not purchased the personalization services, all households are assumed to have a coupon face value of zero.³

Stage 2: Retailer takes the information about wholesale prices and coupons issued in setting retail prices. Since the coupons are issued by the retailer, it is reasonable to assume that the retailers take into account the coupons issued in setting retail prices.⁴

Stage 3: Given the retail prices and coupons issued, the household makes buying decisions in order to maximize utility. We now develop a detailed model of these three stages of Phase II.

We describe the decisions faced by each of the players below. We begin with the consumer model, then describe the retailer and manufacturer models respectively.

³ Technically manufacturers set the wholesale prices and Catalina decides whether to offer the coupon and what its face value will be, but this distinction is unimportant for the results after the manufacturer has made the decision to purchase the targeting service.

⁴ This model where the manufacturer moves first is the Manufacturer Stackelberg model. Consistent with the previous literature (Sudhir 2001; Besanko et al. 2003), we did not find support for the Vertical Nash Interaction where the manufacturer and retailer moves simultaneously. Therefore we omit details of the Vertical Nash model for brevity.

Consumer

A household i ($i = 1, 2, \dots, H$) chooses one of J available brands (denoted by $j = 1 \dots J$) in the category or decides not to purchase in the category ($j = 0$, the no-purchase alternative or ‘outside good’) on each household shopping occasion $t = 1, 2, \dots, n_i$. Let the vector X_{ijt} denote all variables for brand j experienced by household i at shopping occasion t . This vector includes brand-specific indicators, marketing mix variables such as features, displays, and household-specific variables which depend on the previous purchase/s such as state dependence and household stock on occasion t .

Consumers choose the brand that offers the maximum utility. We specify the indirect utility of household i for brand j ($j = 1 \dots J$) on shopping occasion t as follows:

$$u_{ijt} = X_{ijt}\beta - r_{jt}\alpha + \xi_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where X_{ijt} includes all variables that affect household i 's evaluation of brand j on occasion t as well as time invariant brand intercepts, r_{jt} is the price of brand j at t , ξ_{jt} is the brand j -specific effect on utility at shopping occasion t that affects all households but which is unobserved by the econometrician, and ε_{ijt} is the unobserved utility of brands that vary over shopping occasions across households.

Since the indirect utility for any item in the choice set is identified only in terms of differences with respect to a base choice in the logit model, we treat the outside good as the base choice and normalize its utility as follows:

$$u_{i0t} = \varepsilon_{i0t}$$

The elements of the vector $\varepsilon_{it} = (\varepsilon_{i0t}, \varepsilon_{i1t}, \dots, \varepsilon_{iJt})$ each are assumed to follow an independent Gumbel distribution with mean zero and scale parameter 1.

We model heterogeneity using a latent class framework (Kamakura and Russell 1989)⁵. Consumers are probabilistically allocated to one of K segments, where each segment k has its

⁵ The latent class model with discrete segments has considerable empirical validity and managerial relevance (Wedel and Kamakura 2000). A competing model is one which characterizes consumer heterogeneity using a continuous heterogeneity distribution (Gonul and Srinivasan, 1993). Andrews et al. (2002) find that both the discrete and continuous heterogeneity distributions fit the data fairly well, though some papers have argued that continuous heterogeneity coupled with discrete heterogeneity can fit the data better (Allenby et al. 1998). In this paper, we apply the latent class approach because of its computational tractability when solving for the equilibrium targeting prices with competitive and retailer reactions.

own parameter vector (α^k, β^k) . The size of segment k is denoted as f^k , which can be interpreted as the likelihood of finding a consumer in segment k , or the relative size of the segment in the population of consumers. The probability that household i that belongs to segment k chooses a brand j is given by:

$$S_{ijt}^k = \frac{\exp(X_{ijt}\beta^k - r_{ijt}\alpha^k + \xi_{jt})}{\sum_l \exp(X_{ilt}\beta^k - r_{ilt}\alpha^k + \xi_{jt})} \quad (2)$$

Note that ξ_{jt} are the common demand shocks that affect all consumers. These are observable by the price-setting firms and consumers in the market but unobservable by the researchers. Villas-Boas and Winer (1999) show that profit-maximizing firms will take ξ_{jt} into account when setting prices, therefore price is correlated with ξ_{jt} . This causes a price endogeneity problem. Without correcting for endogeneity, the price coefficient will be biased towards zero. We will discuss how we address this issue in the estimation section.

Because f^k represents the likelihood of finding a consumer in segment k , the unconditional probability of choice for brand j by consumer i in time period t can be computed as:

$$S_{ijt} = \sum_{k=1}^K f^k S_{ijt}^k = \sum_{k=1}^K f^k \left(\frac{\exp(X_{ijt}\beta^k - r_{ijt}\alpha^k + \xi_{jt})}{\sum_l \exp(X_{ilt}\beta^k - r_{ilt}\alpha^k + \xi_{jt})} \right) \quad (3)$$

Following earlier literature (e.g., Besanko et al. 1998), we assume the potential market size for the category in any store-week to be the number of households that make shopping trips (N_t) to that store in that week. On any given week on which a store visit is made, the consumer can choose to make the purchase incidence decision, or the brand choice decision within the category.

Retailer

The retailer's goal is to maximize category profits in time period t , given the decisions to buy personalization services by manufacturers. Let $x = 1(0)$ denote whether manufacturer 1 has purchased (not purchased) the personalization service. Similarly, let $y = 1(0)$ denote whether manufacturer 2 has purchased (not purchased) the personalization service. Therefore the retailer chooses retail prices $r_{1t}^{xy}, \dots, r_{jt}^{xy}$, conditional on which firms have purchased the personalization service to solve the following problem:

$$\max_{r_{jt}^{xy}, \dots, r_{jt}^{xy}} \Pi_{Rt}^{xy} = \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{i=1}^{N_i} (r_{jt}^{xy} - w_{jt}^{xy}) S_{ijt} (r_{jt}^{xy} - D_{ijt}^{xy}) \quad (4)$$

where D_{ijt}^{xy} is a matrix of individual specific coupon values as described earlier under the alternative scenarios where the different manufacturers purchase the targeting service. The shares in the above equation are the weighted average of the segment-specific shares across the k segments. Taking the first order conditions of equation (4) with respect to retail prices, we obtain the retailer's pricing equation for each product in the category in terms of wholesale prices. The details of the derivation are provided in Appendix A. The retailer price equation is shown in equation A5 of the appendix.

Manufacturer

A manufacturer 'm' offering a subset \aleph_m of brands in the market sets the wholesale price w_{jt}^{xy} (where $j \in \aleph_m$) and the coupon face values to individual households (D_{ijt}^{xy}) so as to maximize the manufacturer's profits. A manufacturer who has not been sold the personalization service will have coupon face values set to zero. The manufacturer takes into account the knowledge that retailer prices (r_{jt}^{xy}) will be set taking into account the wholesale prices and the coupon face values that have been issued to individual households. The profit of manufacturer m at time t from the sales of goods is given by:

$$\Pi_{mt}^{xy} = \sum_{j \in \aleph_m} \sum_{i=1}^{N_i} (w_{jt}^{xy} - D_{ijt}^{xy} - c_{jt}) S_{ijt} (r_{jt}^{xy} (w_{jt}^{xy}, D_{ijt}^{xy}) - D_{ijt}^{xy}) \quad (5)$$

where c_{jt} is the marginal cost of the manufacturer for brand j in period t , and $S_{ijt}^{xy} (r_{jt}^{xy} (w_{jt}^{xy}, D_{ijt}^{xy}) - D_{ijt}^{xy})$ is the probability of household i , buying brand j in period t given the decisions of manufacturers 1 (denoted by x) and 2 (denoted by y) to purchase the purchase history data. Note that the retailer sets the retail price taking into account both the wholesale price (w_{jt}^{xy}) and the vector of discounts offered to all households, i.e., $D_{jt}^{xy} = \{D_{ijt}^{xy}\}_{i=1}^H$.

We can write the manufacturer profit equations at the individual level as follows:

$$\Pi_{mt}^{xy i} = \sum_{j \in \aleph_m} (w_{jt}^{xy} - D_{ijt}^{xy} - c_{jt}) S_{ijt} (r_{jt}^{xy} (w_{jt}^{xy}, D_{ijt}^{xy}) - D_{ijt}^{xy})$$

Taking the first order conditions of (5), with respect to $w_{ijt}^{xy} = w_{jt}^{xy} - D_{ijt}^{xy}$, we are able to solve for the effective margin from each household. Then the wholesale price will be $w_{jt}^{xy} = \max_i w_{ijt}^{xy}$ and $D_{ijt}^{xy} = w_{jt}^{xy} - w_{ijt}^{xy}$. The derivation is detailed in the Appendix A.

We specify manufacturer marginal cost as a function of factor prices, which assumes a fixed proportions production technology.

$$c_{jt} = \lambda_j + \theta * B_t + v_{jt} \quad (6)$$

where B_t are the factor prices, λ_j are brand specific intercepts and v_{jt} is the cost shock.

Estimation and Solution Strategy

The solution strategy consists of the following five steps, where the first two steps involve estimation to characterize the market and the remaining three steps involve policy simulations to infer the optimal strategy for the personalization service firm.

Step 1: Estimate the demand and supply model discussed above. The demand model is a latent class model of household preferences and responsiveness to marketing mix with alternative levels of purchase history lengths used to proxy for personalization quality from consumer information.⁶ To account for potential price endogeneity concerns, we use the control function approach developed by Petrin and Train (2004). Essentially, we obtain residuals from a regression of prices of the different brands against its cost factors and include these residuals in the utility equation (1) in estimating the demand model. More details of the control function approach are explained in appendix B.

Step 2: Apply Bayes' rule on the aggregate latent class estimates using each household's purchase history (the length of history varies depending on the scenario being considered and the number of visits of the household during the estimation period) to obtain household level probabilities of membership in each of the latent classes. When purchase histories are short, the individual level probabilities differ very little from the aggregate probabilities and as the purchase histories lengthen, the individual probabilities tend to become more different from the aggregate probabilities reflecting more closely the idiosyncratic preferences of the household.

⁶ Other aspects of consumer information, such as consumer demographics could potentially improve the quality of the personalization service, but the incremental impact of demographics over purchase history was miniscule in our analysis. So we focus on purchase history length as a measure of accuracy and omit demographics in further analysis. This is consistent with the findings in Rossi et al. (1996).

The manufacturers may use varying levels of information about consumer purchase history in targeting them. To incorporate this information, consumers are classified to demand segments by using the result that the posterior probability that a consumer ‘ i ’ belongs to a segment ‘ k ’ conditional on observed choice history H^i is obtained by revising the prior probability of membership f^k in a Bayesian fashion (Kamakura and Russell 1989):

$$\Pr(i \in k | H^i) = \frac{L(H^i | k) f^k}{\sum_{k'} L(H^i | k') f^{k'}} \quad (7)$$

Step 3: Having thus characterized the household level preferences using different lengths of purchase history data, solve for the optimal prices and discounts under alternative targeting scenarios (exclusive, non-exclusive). To obtain steady state profit estimates, solve for prices and discounts over a large number of weeks tracking both consumer past purchases (to account for state dependence effects) and inventories (to account for inventory effects on category purchases) over this period. In solving for the equilibrium prices and discounts, take into account not only the pricing behavior of the manufacturers, but also the equilibrium passthrough behavior of retailers. The same marketing mix variables for features and displays as in the estimation data are used in this simulation.

Step 4: Given the optimal prices and discounts computed based on Step 3, evaluate manufacturer profits based on consumer choices, at the optimal prices and discounts. Note that optimal prices and discounts will vary depending on the available purchase history and which firms do targeting. However consumer behavior should be based on the same “true” preferences irrespective of what data firms have. Hence in predicting consumer choice, given the chosen prices and discounts, it is critical to always use the household level estimates obtained using the full purchase history data, because these are our best estimates of the “true” household behavior. One should not use the estimates obtained with shorter purchase histories at this stage as this will grossly overstate the profitability of targeting. On first glance, this issue may appear a “mere detail,” but we find that the improvements in profits in earlier papers (Rossi and Allenby, 1996; Besanko et al., 2003) can be overstated if we do not assume a “true” stable consumer behavior based on the full purchase history.

Step 5: Given the profits obtained under alternative targeting scenarios of history length (full purchase history, only last purchase, only last visit, no targeting) and client choice

(exclusive, non-exclusive), solve for the optimal strategy for the personalization service provider, that answers the three questions (what to sell, to whom to sell and for how much) we seek to answer.

3. Empirical Illustration

Data

We use the AC Nielsen scanner panel data on the ketchup category from the largest retailer in the Springfield, MO market for the empirical illustration. We restrict attention to the four largest brand-sizes which collectively account for 64% of the sales in this category: Heinz 32 oz, Hunt's 32 oz, Heinz 28 oz, and the Store Brand 32 oz and use 100 weeks of purchase history data during 1986 to 1988. We use a sample of 143 households based on whether they made at least five purchases of the chosen brand-sizes during the 100 weeks of analysis. The 143 households bought ketchup in 1073 visits out of the total 11660 store visits.

The summary of brand shares (conditional on purchase) and prices are given in Table 2.

*** Insert Table 2***

Estimation Results

Based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), we found that a three segment latent class model is the best model. As discussed earlier, we correct for price endogeneity using the approach in Petrin and Train (2003). The results are presented in Table 3 below. Segment 2 is the least price sensitive, but also purchases least in the category based on the negative coefficients associated with the intercept. It is 24% of the market. Segments 1 and 3 are more price sensitive than segment 2 and together constitute 76% of the market. However Segment 1 is relatively more loyal to Heinz 32 oz. Segment 3's preferences are more diffused across all brands and is the most price sensitive segment in the market, suggesting the least amount of loyalty. They were also relatively insensitive to inventory levels. This suggests that this segment does not purchase ketchup at regular intervals, but opportunistically buy any brand when it is on sale.

*** Insert Table 3***

The price elasticities for the three segment latent class demand model as described by Kamakura and Russell (1989) and reported in Table 4. The own and cross price effects are as expected. Hunt's 32 and the Store Brand 32 have higher own elasticities than the two Heinz brand-sizes. Heinz 28, the most expensive brand, has the lowest own elasticity. Hunt's 32 and Store 32 have higher cross-elasticities, which indicate that switching would be higher between

these brand-sizes. Increase in the price of the largest brand-size Heinz 32, will result in more substantial substitution to Hunt's 32 and Store 32 rather than Heinz 28.

*** Insert Table 4***

The cost estimates in Table 5 obtained through the estimation of Equation 6 suggest that Heinz and the store brand have lower marginal costs than Hunt's (though the differences are not significant). The price of tomatoes⁷ (the main ingredient of ketchup) is used as the factor cost in the cost equation. Not surprisingly, tomato prices have a significant effect on marginal cost of ketchup.

*** Insert Table 5***

4. Analysis of Personalization Service Provider Decisions

Based on the estimates obtained in Section 3, we can now evaluate the profitability of the alternative decision scenarios from the personalization service provider's perspective using simulations. We simulate the market for 100 weeks, which is a sufficiently long period to obtain stable estimates of profits under alternative decision scenarios.⁸

We first demonstrate how length of purchase history affects the ability to personalize promotions in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we evaluate the profits of manufacturers (Heinz and Hunt's) from the sale of goods as a function of whether they use personalized coupons either on an exclusive or syndicated basis, i.e., we compute $(\Pi_1^{10}, \Pi_1^{01}, \Pi_2^{10}, \Pi_2^{01}, \Pi_1^{11}, \Pi_1^{11})$ for different lengths of purchase history. Based on these profits, we infer what price the personalization service provider can charge under different scenarios and thus arrive at the optimal decisions of the personalization services vendor in Section 4.3.

4.1 How Length of Consumer Purchase History affects Personalization

It is natural that personalization can be improved by increasing the length of consumer purchase history information used in targeting. This is the rationale used by Catalina Marketing, in offering two different targeting products to packaged goods manufacturers, one which uses

⁷ The price data for tomatoes were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Part of the data was obtained from the website and the rest through email from BLS officials.

⁸ Average profits per week were very stable with consumer choices simulated over one hundred weeks. Increasing the period of simulation further had no effect on the results, but simply increased computation time.

only the last purchase by a customer, and a second which uses the last 65 weeks of consumer purchase history.

We now investigate how the length of purchase history affects the extent to which personalization can be improved. First, to compare against the results of Besanko et al. (2003), we investigate the scenario where only *last visit* information is used for targeting. Second, to be consistent with Catalina's couponing strategy and to compare the scenarios in Rossi et al. (1996), we investigate the scenarios where only *last purchase* information is used and where the *fully available purchase history* is used. Figures 3a-3c shows how the posterior probabilities (of belonging to segment 1) of consumers change as a function of the information used. Figure 3a shows the distribution of posterior probabilities using only the last week's information of consumer purchases, Figure 3b shows the distribution of posterior probabilities using only the last consumer purchases (which could be an earlier week if no purchase was made in the category in the last week) and Figure 3c shows the distribution of posterior probabilities using 100 weeks of consumer purchase history. Figure 3a clearly shows that the marketer can achieve very little discrimination across consumers by using only information about the last visit, as the vast majority of consumers are classified in the same quintile as the aggregate probability (f^k in Equation 7), i.e., 0.47 for Segment 1. The last purchase information enables more discrimination to be achieved between consumers, as seen in Figure 3b. We can achieve much better discrimination among consumers by using 100 weeks of consumer purchase information, as shown in the polarized probabilities in Figure 3c. By using 100 weeks of information, almost 40% of consumers are assigned with a high degree of probability (posterior probability in the highest quintile) to segment 1, while more than 40% of consumers are not assigned to segment 1 with a high degree of probability (posterior probability in the lowest quintile).

*** Insert Figures 3a, 3b and 3c***

4.2 The Effect of Personalized Coupons on Manufacturer Client Profits

We now assess how the profits of manufacturer clients (Heinz and Hunt's) change as a function of personalized coupons. We consider situations (1) when targeted couponing is done exclusively by Heinz or Hunt's and when both firms do targeting and (2) when targeting is based merely on *last visit* data or on the *last purchase* data, or based on the *full purchase history* data. In performing this analysis, we control for retailer behavior by assuming that the retailer does not

target for the store brands using the purchase history data available to it.⁹ The profitability results are reported in Table 6. Several insights emerge.

*** Insert Table 6***

First, we see that personalized promotions by both firms increase profits under the last visit scenario, the last purchase scenario and the full purchase history scenarios, relative to the no-targeting scenario. Further, the profits are greater for the full purchase history scenario compared to both the last purchase and last visit scenario. This shows that in this market, the positive price discrimination effect of targeting dominates the negative competitive effect of targeting. Even with the full purchase history being used, the price discrimination effect is increasing (we checked intermediate lengths of purchase history data and find profits increase as the number of weeks of data used for targeting increases). Essentially, this suggests that even with the full purchase history of our dataset we have not reached the peak of the inverted U relationship between targeting accuracy and profitability in a competitive targeting scenario that was derived theoretically in Chen et al (2001).

Second, we compare the case where only one firm exclusively targets versus the case where both firms target. Under targeting using full purchase history, Heinz makes more profits when both firms target than when Heinz alone targets. This shows that *there is a positive externality from the use of targeting for Heinz* in this market. For Hunt's there is a small decrease in profits when both firms target as compared to when Hunt's only targets, showing that *there is a negative externality for Hunt's*.

Finally, we examine the magnitudes of the improvements in profits from the use of targeting. The maximum profit gain that any firm obtains by using targeted pricing in the ketchup category is about 2%. An improvement of gross margins by 2% can be a substantive increase in net profits. For example, Heinz had a gross margin of 40% and a net margin of 10% in 2003 (Hoover Online). A 2% increase in gross margin can then translate to an increase of about 8% in net margins.

4.2.1 Improving the Accuracy of Estimated Targeting Profits

⁹ We also considered the cases of (a) intermediate lengths of purchase history data, and (b) where the retailer sends targeted coupons for the store brands. Since these alternative scenarios have no impact on the intuition and the qualitative results we do not discuss these in the paper. As discussed earlier, inclusion of demographic variables have very little impact on the personalization.

The increase in gross profit margin in our analysis is smaller than the profit increases reported in Rossi et al. (1996) and Besanko et al. (2003). Using full purchase history data (without demographics), the Rossi et al. study finds an increase of 5% for a product in the tuna category. The Besanko et al. study find improvements of 4% for Heinz and 37% for Hunt's in the ketchup category, merely with the last visit data. We detail below three aspects which have to be taken into account in computing profits from targeting accurately: (1) Inclusion of inventory in the demand model (2) Appropriate modeling of retailer pricing behavior in the supply model (3) A consistent standard of consumer behavior to characterize consumer response to different targeting strategies by manufacturers when they have access to differing levels of consumer information. These three aspects are explained in more detail below.

The first aspect to be taken care of is to realistically include inventory in the demand model. We include inventory in the demand model while the Besanko et al. and Rossi et al models do not. Even though they do not have inventory data, Besanko et al. find suggestive evidence that inclusion of inventories can reduce the potential incremental gain in profits significantly. Category purchase will be overestimated when the effect of inventory is not included in the demand model. Said differently, the absence of inventory in their model implies that consumers who purchase last period are still likely to purchase at the same level in the current period. This overestimates the benefits of accurate price targeting. Rossi et al. use a conditional choice model, so they do not model inventory issues.

The second aspect to be taken care of in computing targeting profits accurately is to model retailer pricing behavior appropriately. How much will the retailer pass through when there is targeting couponing activity by the manufacturer? Rossi et al (1996), do not consider manufacturer or retailer reaction to personalized couponing by one firm and obtain higher profits than our estimates. In a subsequent section on "The Retailer's Perspective on Personalization Services," we investigate a scenario, where the retailer does not optimally adjust the markup, but simply charges a constant markup of 25% over the wholesale price. We find that in this case (Table 11), Heinz profits increase by about 11%, in a manner comparable to the Rossi et al. paper. Hence our improvement in margins where we allow both competing manufacturers and the retailer to react optimally is the lower bound of the potential increase in profits. In reality, the retailer reactions are unlikely to be completely optimal and the potential increase in profit margins can be greater as we see in our constant markup analysis.

The final aspect to be taken into account in computing targeting profits is to maintain a consistent standard of consumer purchase behavior. In the Besanko et al. study, the profits under aggregate data and the last visit data are computed with consumer behavior also assumed to be consistent with the level of detail of data available for targeting. However, this approach is incorrect, because we should treat consumer behavior as invariant to the level of data used to estimate their preferences. We therefore use the estimates obtained using full history data as our best approximation of the “true” consumer behavior. While we also find higher improvements in profits using the approach in Besanko et al. (2003), the incremental gains are much smaller when we make the assumption of stable consumer behavior. A similar issue is independently described when computing value functions in dynamic programming models in Mannor et al. (2004).

In Table 7 we illustrate how the omission of a consistent standard of consumer behavior can affect estimates of targeting profits. The first two rows illustrate that using just the information about consumers in characterizing consumer response can result in an ‘increase’ in profit estimates by 5.58% for Heinz and 2.52% for Hunt’s. These two rows are for situations where neither firm targets. The difference is purely a bias introduced due to posterior allocations based on consumer history leading to different shares being estimated for the brands. We also note that the ‘profit increases from targeting’ in Table 7 are much higher than the figures we reported in Table 6 and very similar to the profit increases reported by Rossi et al (1996) and some of the figures of Besanko et al (2003). Future research on targeting needs to take cognizance of this possible oversight when computing profits from targeting.

*** Insert Table 7***

4.2.2 Profile of Consumers Targeted

To gain an understanding of how personalized promotions improve profitability, it is useful to identify the profiles of households targeted by Heinz and Hunt’s. In equilibrium, Heinz conducts its targeting entirely through the popular Heinz 32 oz, hence we focus on the households receiving coupons for the 32 oz Heinz. Figure 4a shows the posterior segment

probabilities of households targeted by Heinz 32 oz¹⁰. Households targeted by Heinz 32 have a 68% probability of being in Segment 3 and 31% probability of being in Segment 1. This makes sense since these two segments are relatively more price sensitive and are therefore likely to respond to coupons. Segment 3, which is the heavy user segment, but price sensitive and has no strong loyalty receives the most coupons from Heinz. In contrast, Segment 1 households that are loyal to Heinz 32, receive fewer coupons from Heinz 32 oz. Thus Heinz is able to increase the profit margins from households that are likely to be in Segment 1 (47% of market size), but competes aggressively with lower prices for households in Segment 3 (29% of market size). Overall, Heinz offers targeted coupons to about 32% of households in the market.

*** Insert Figures 4a and 4b***

Figure 4b shows the allocation of consumers targeted by Hunt's 32. Consumers targeted by Hunt's 32 are predominantly allocated to segment 3, the most price sensitive segment. While this segment also does not have strong brand loyalty, it marginally favors the cheaper Hunt's brand. However, given the lack of strong loyalty, Hunt's uses coupons to defend market shares in this segment. Hunt's 32 oz offers coupons relatively infrequently to households belonging to other two segments. Overall, Hunt's offers targeted coupons to only about 7% of households in the market.

4.2.3 Identifying Sources of Targeting Profits

We now present additional diagnostics on the sources of the increase in profits from personalized coupons. The increase in profits can arise from three sources: higher margins, higher brand shares and consumption expansion. Since overall ketchup consumption is not expected to expand a great deal merely due to couponing, we expect the contribution of consumption expansion to be low. Indeed the category purchase expansion due to targeting is merely 0.4%. We report the effect of targeting on each brand's shares and profit margins (in the full purchase history case) in Table 8 below. The average margins across all households are calculated by appropriately weighting the margins using household level brand shares.

¹⁰ For the sake of exposition in Figures 4a and 4b we label the segments based on some striking characteristics of each segment. Segment 1 is labeled 'Heinz 32 loyals, price sensitives', segment 2 is labeled 'Heinz 28 loyals, light users' and segment 3 is labeled 'heavy users, inertial, price sensitives'.

*** Insert Table 8***

As can be seen, the gain in profits for Heinz 32 oz is essentially from price discrimination. Its average margins increase by about 3.0%. The increase in margins comes at the expense of its brand share which fell by about 0.3%. In contrast, for both Heinz 28 oz and Hunt's 32 oz, we see there is both an increase in share and margins, though the increases in both are moderate. Thus Heinz 32 oz is willing to take a share cut, in order to increase its profits through higher profit margins from price discrimination. We also note that the increase in the profits of Heinz accrues mostly from the increase in margins for Heinz 32, and to a far lesser extent from Heinz 28. In fact, price optimization across the product line for Heinz results in an interesting pattern. All of the individual level targeting by Heinz is done through Heinz 32, no coupons are issued for Heinz 28.

Further the targeting by Heinz 32 is more extensive, with a third of consumers being targeted compared to only about a tenth of consumers targeted by Hunt's 32. The depth of discounts issued by Heinz is also greater than that of Hunt's 32 oz. As one would expect, the aggregate prices of Heinz 32 increases due to this selective discounting. Apart from the loss in brand share for Heinz 32, the store brand 32 also loses share (-0.5%).

The most interesting part of the results is the asymmetry in the strategies of Heinz and Hunt's 32 oz. While Heinz would lose 0.3% in brand share in order to gain profits by increasing its margins by about 3%, Hunt's gains share by as much as 3.6%, even after increasing margins by about 1.2%. As the smaller brand, Hunt's is able to take advantage of the increase in prices by Heinz to increase its share (on its smaller base), even with a price increase. Thus Heinz prices less aggressively than Hunt's in the presence of personalized pricing, because as the larger brand it is able to gain more from personalized pricing. As shown in the lower two panels of Table 8, these patterns are consistent with the results even when only one of the firms (either Heinz or Hunt's) targets consumers.

In summary, the larger firm gains much more from the increased average margins obtained from personalized promotions compared to the smaller firm. This is due to the larger firm's ability to obtain higher margins over a larger base. Further, despite the threat of increased

competition due to personalized promotions, both firms are able to increase their profits by offering personalized promotions.

4.3 Evaluating Strategic Options for the Personalization Service Provider

We next evaluate the optimal strategies for the Personalization Service Provider (e.g. Catalina). Since Catalina always gains by selling to either Heinz or Hunt's the price it can charge from a given client is the difference in profits of the client in the particular scenario being evaluated, relative to the scenario when only one of the other clients will receive the targeting service. For example, the price that the vendor can charge from selling to Heinz (denoted as firm 1) exclusively when selling the full purchase history is $P_1^f = \Pi_1^{10} - \Pi_1^{01} = 82522 - 80926 = 1,596$. Table 9 shows the price that the vendor will charge in each of the targeting scenarios and the total profits (assuming zero costs) that the vendor makes.

*** Insert Table 9***

It is clear from the table that the greatest profits for the vendor can be obtained when both Heinz and Hunt's target using the full purchase history (\$1655). Therefore the firm will sell the targeting service to *both firms* ("whom to sell to?"), using the *full purchase history* of 100 weeks available ("what to sell?") at a *price of \$1611 to Heinz and \$44 to Hunts* ("for how much to sell?").

The results suggest that the total profits for the personalization services vendor that can be obtained from using merely last visit/last purchase based targeting is small compared to the profits obtained from using the full history. For example with both firms targeting, the vendor makes only \$14 in profits from last visit based targeting, where as it makes \$1655 from full visit history based targeting. Another interesting aspect of the results is that while clearly most of the profits for the personalization service vendor comes from Heinz, offering the service to Hunt's (even for free) can increase the price that can be obtained from Heinz. This is because while offering the service only to Heinz the vendor makes \$1596, but if Hunt's also uses the service, Heinz will be willing to pay the vendor \$1655.

Thus in this category, Catalina would be better off if it sold its service on a non-exclusive service to both vendors. Its current strategy of offering the service to only one firm is not optimal and should be re-evaluated. Further, we find that as we increase the length of purchase data even up to 100 weeks, the profitability of downstream clients continue to increase. This suggests that

restricting the data used for targeting to merely 65 weeks is sub-optimal. In infrequently purchased categories such as ketchup, the information obtained from purchases over 65 weeks of data is not that large. Catalina can improve its profitability by increasing the length of purchase history used in targeting. Given data storage continues to become cheaper, this should be technologically feasible.

5. The Retailer's Perspective on Personalization Services

The retailer is an essential player in the kind of (manufacturer-initiated) targeted coupon activity described in this paper, since the retail store is the point of purchase, the place where the consumer purchase data are collected, where customized coupons are printed and delivered and where the coupons are redeemed. The retail loyalty card is most often the means of identifying the consumer and the coupons are usually redeemable only in the same retail chain where purchases are made. Given the symbiotic nature of the relationship between the retailer and the personalization services provider and given that the retailer often has extensive consumer purchase information through loyalty programs, it is interesting to ascertain how the retailer will be affected by the use of personalized promotions by manufacturers. Specifically, we examine (1) the impact on retailer profits by the use of personalized promotions activities by manufacturers and (2) the impact on profitability for the retailer by becoming a vendor of personalized promotions at its retail stores.

*** Insert Table 10***

Table 10 shows that the retailer profits increase the most when both manufacturers target households through personalized promotions. The retailer profits increase by \$1291 when both manufacturers target. It is also interesting that the retailer is able to grab a larger share of the increase in channel profits when the smaller player (Hunt's) alone targets, where its profits increase by \$1111, than when the larger player (Heinz) alone targets, where its profits increase by \$110. This is because the smaller firm is more aggressive in trying to gain market share than the larger firm, and in turn suppressing wholesale prices. This allows the retailer to charge a higher margin and increase its profits. The second column in the table represents an upper bound on the profits for the retailer if it were to enter the personalization services business.

Since the retailer profits go up when manufacturers target, this analysis raises the intriguing possibility that the retailer could actually forgo some proportion of its profits from the

targeting services business in order to benefit from increase in ketchup profits due to targeting. This analysis provides a compelling economic rationale for the retailer to cooperate in the network of the targeting services provider, which is a feature of the targeted coupon services industry today. The analysis could also imply that if retailers can overcome any potential entry barriers by entering the personalized promotion service business, they could be formidable competitors to a company like Catalina Marketing, not only because such retailers may withdraw themselves from the targeting services network (such as the ‘Catalina Marketing Network’) but also because they would have considerable economic incentive to price their targeting services more aggressively than ‘pure’ targeting services providers can afford.¹¹

The above analyses assume that the retailer reacts optimally and adjusts its retailer prices in response to the targeting activities of the manufacturer, and thus competes aggressively for a share of the increase in channel profits due to targeting. It is possible that the retailer may not react optimally to manufacturer targeting due to limitations in the retailer’s knowledge of manufacturer actions, constraints on retailer marketing effort due to limited resources of skilled manpower, technology or investment. An alternative scenario of retailer behavior could be that the retailer uses a simple markup pricing scheme.

The profits from targeting by both manufacturers using full history where the retailer adopts a simple markup pricing scheme of 25% over wholesale price is given in Table 11. Comparing the profits with the no-targeting scenario, the total channel profit is lower (by about 5%) when the retailer charges constant markup of 25%, rather than the optimal markups. Further, as expected the retailer makes less profits with a constant markup rule. When the retailer charges the non-optimal constant markup, the larger firm Heinz benefits more and obtains a larger proportion of total channel profits.

*** Insert Table 11***

Table 11 shows that incremental manufacturer profits from targeting are higher when the retailer simply charges a constant markup. Heinz, the largest manufacturer, takes the lion’s share of the increase in channel profits, while there is a small increase in the profits of Hunt’s. The incremental profits from targeting for Heinz are almost 11% when the retailer charges a constant markup, while it is about 2% when the retailer adjusts its markup optimally. Since all retailers

¹¹ In personal conversations with an official at leading retailer who wishes to remain anonymous, we were informed that they provide targeting services informally (for free) to manufacturers.

may not adjust their markup optimally (or at least in the short-run), the potential increase in profits from personalized promotions by manufacturers will be greater than the 2%. Thus we may treat 2% as a lower bound of the potential increase in profitability. We also note that the increase in gross margins can be greater in categories with potential for category expansion.

6. Conclusion

The potential for personalized marketing has been growing due to advances in data collection and analysis technologies as well as advertising and promotion delivery technologies. In contrast to extant research on the personalization services which have an “engineering” orientation, this paper develops the first empirically grounded approach to answer strategic questions of interest to personalization service providers.

Our analysis enabled us to obtain interesting substantive insights of interest to a personalization service provider. First, as discussed in the introduction, Catalina is currently re-evaluating its policy of offering targeting services on an exclusive basis to manufacturers. Given the strong reservations that have been expressed in the theoretical literature about the potential negative externalities that are likely to be induced by competitive targeting, Catalina indeed needs to be careful in shifting from its extant policy of selling its targeted couponing services only on an exclusive basis. However, our analysis shows that in the category we analyze, Catalina can increase its profits by selling to multiple manufacturers. By performing such an analysis on a category-by-category basis, Catalina can identify categories in which it can improve profits by shifting from its policy of exclusivity.

Second, we are able to offer the insight that the retailer is likely to be a potent competitor to Catalina. Ginocchio et al (2005) suggest that a major threat to Catalina’s growth is the growing market share of Wal-Mart in groceries. Since Wal-Mart does not offer targeted coupons and is not part of Catalina’s network, this can hamper Catalina’s growth. According to the report, a second major threat is from Valassis Communications (currently in the business of offering coupons in free standing inserts) which is considering entry into Catalina’s targeted couponing business. The report however suggests that Valassis will find it difficult to replicate Catalina’s success given its strong relationship with retailers.

Our analysis suggests that that the major threat to Catalina may not be from Wal-Mart or Valassis, but certain large retailers themselves, because they can effectively subsidize the price

of the personalization service because it makes considerable increases in its retail profits due to personalization. This threat should be salient given that many retailers (e.g., Tesco in U.K. Kroger in U.S.) are developing their own technologies for offering personalized coupons to customers.¹² Indeed the retailer might be the most powerful potential competitor to Catalina in the future.

Finally, we find that Catalina may wish to increase the length of purchase history it uses in its targeting services, from the current self-imposed limit of 65 weeks. Even if storage costs are currently a consideration for the current limit of length of purchase history used, the declining costs of storage and computing speeds should make it possible for Catalina to increase the length of history used for personalization in the future profitably.

Our analysis also highlighted a key methodological issue that one needs to consider when evaluating the profitability of targeted promotions using alternative purchase history lengths. While the optimal prices and coupons should of course be computed as in previous research using the available length of purchase history, the evaluation of the profitability of the alternative scenarios should be using a stable (one's best possible) estimate of consumer preferences. In our analysis, we consistently used the consumer preference estimates based on full purchase history data, when doing the profitability analysis. We showed that the inflated estimates of benefits from targeting using simply last visit or last purchase history data in past research is due to the fact that profitability analysis assumed (incorrectly) different estimates of consumer preferences for the no targeting (no purchase history) and targeting (last visit/last purchase) scenarios. We caution against this in future research.

In summary, we believe that the approach outlined in this paper offers a framework to investigate strategic options faced by personalization service vendors. There are a number of ways in which this research can be extended. First, it would be interesting to investigate the robustness of our results across multiple categories. In this paper, we find that the increase in profits from targeting in the ketchup category is relatively low. While we chose this category because we sought to compare our results to those of Besanko et al. (2003) who perform targeting using only aggregate data, one issue is that there is very little category expansion in this category. In conversations with a Vice President at Catalina, we were told that they expect

¹² Senior managers at certain leading supermarket chains have in discussions stated that they offer targeted coupon services for free to all their manufacturers, while other retailers charge for the service.

substantially higher gains in categories such as snack foods where there is potential for category expansion. One expects that a similar analysis in such expandable product categories will yield greater increases in profits due to targeting.

Second, we can expand upon the nature of personalization data used for targeting. Here we have treated “purchase history length” as the essential strategic variable with respect to the quality of the data. However, quality may be increased by greater “breadth” of the data. Greater breadth of data can be due to inclusion of demographic variables as well as through integrating purchase behavior from other categories (Ainslie and Rossi 1998). We did not focus on demographics, because we did not find much value in it for targeting (consistent with earlier studies such as Rossi et al. 1996). However, there can be considerable gains in targeting accuracy by looking at consumer behavior across categories. While computation and estimation is a much harder task with analysis across categories, we believe this would be an important area for future work. In general, this approach can identify the potential profitability of cross-selling services.

Finally, we hope that that the approach used in this paper will inspire additional research to facilitate decision making in other personalization contexts such as in durable goods markets, financial services, catalog marketing and targeted advertising. In the contexts of durable goods or financial services, there will be shorter purchase histories, but greater information across categories that can be used for personalization. In the context of targeted advertising services, the empirical model needs to calibrate the impact of advertising (rather than couponing) on consumer purchasing decisions. In short, while appropriate changes are needed for the model to deal with institutional details appropriate for each context, the general framework of understanding the tradeoffs involved in improving quality and selling to exclusive/multiple clients will continue to be relevant. More broadly, we hope that this approach will spawn similar complementary research to game theoretic analysis on other marketing institutions to help decision makers and managers obtain empirically driven answers to their business strategy questions.

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Figure 1: Schematic of the Market




Figure 2: Decision Tree and Payoffs




Figure 3a




Figure 3b




Figure 3c




Figure 4a




Figure 4b




Table 1: Illustrative Set of Companies in the Personalization Services Industry

Company/ Division	2004 Revenue (\$ mil.)	% of total company revenue	2004 Market Cap (\$ mil.)	Client profile, Client examples	Revenue Growth rate	Description
Catalina Marketing, Inc	470	100%	1400	Manufacturers of packaged goods, grocery retailers e.g. Nestle, Safeway	8% p.a. over 2000-2004	Proprietary technology at point of purchase in grocery and pharma retailers to track customer transactions and deliver customized coupons. Tracks over 250 million transactions per week across more than 21,000 supermarkets worldwide, tracks purchase history of over 100 million households in U.S. Delivers more than 4.5 billion customized promotional messages.
Doubleclick, Inc (Abacus B2C division)	105	35%	984	Catalog merchants, e.g., LL Bean, Sharper Image	10%(2004), 15.1% (2003)	Consolidates the input from 1,550 catalog, online, and retail merchants into a single database. Data on over 4.4 billion transactions from catalog call-centers, websites, and retail stores, made by over 90 million households, with household purchase data stretching back 5 years.
Experian's z-24 Division	501	23%	NA	Catalog companies, e.g., Boston Proper, JJill, Retailers, non-profits	6% p.a. over 2001-2004	The Z-24 database is similar to Abacus. Data from over 755 catalogs with 38 million households that have purchased over the last two months. Experian is also a player in B2B targeting with BizInsight's database of more than 15 million U.S. based businesses.
VT &NH's Direct Marketing Group's I-Behavior	NA	NA	NA	Catalog companies, e.g., Gardener's Supply, Vermont Country Store	NA	Competitor to Abacus and Z-24, but uses transactional data at the <i>SKU</i> <i>level</i> (in contrast to Abacus and Z-24 which uses catalog level data). 1000+ contributors, mostly medium sized catalog companies, data on 103 million consumers, 89 million households.
Harte Hanks' Direct Marketing Division	641	62%	2448	Retailers, finance sector, pharmaceuticals, telecom & high- tech	9% (2004), 2% (2003)	Specializes in providing targeting solutions in automotive, consumer products, financial services, insurance, high tech, pharma, retail and telecom. Provides suite of services from constructing the database (Trillium Software System), accessing the data (Allink [®] suite, inTouch), in-house data analytics, application and execution of campaigns.
Cool Savings, Inc	38	100%	NA	Retailers, packaged goods manufacturers, e.g. Unilever, Land O' Lakes, Best Buy	20% p.a. over 2001-2004	Online marketer maintains a network of Web sites featuring a variety of special offers and savings on a range of goods and services from its advertisers. Also offers lead generation, e-mail marketing, and loyalty programs for more than 1,000 companies in retail, packaged goods, and media industries. Uses demographic information from its 20 million visitors to help its advertisers design targeted marketing campaigns and promotions.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Ketchup Data

	Conditional Brand share	Price (\$/ 10 oz)	Feature	Display
Heinz 32 oz	37%	0.41	0.07	0.11
Hunt's 32 oz	13%	0.42	0.02	0.01
Heinz 28 oz	22%	0.50	0.04	0.09
Store Brand 32 oz	28%	0.28	0.12	0.12

Table 3: Demand Model Estimates

	Segment 1 (47%)	Segment 2 (24%)	Segment 3 (29%)
Parameter	Estimate (Std Err)	Estimate (Std Err)	Estimate (Std Err)
Heinz 32 oz	1.90*** (0.56)	-2.26*** (0.49)	1.91*** (0.54)
Hunt's 32 oz	0.61 (0.68)	-3.35*** (0.54)	3.21*** (0.56)
Heinz 28 oz	0.83 (0.73)	-1.85*** (0.61)	2.97*** (0.64)
SB 32 oz	-0.50 (0.50)	-5.56*** (0.42)	1.75*** (0.39)
Price	-13.23*** (1.53)	-2.89*** (1.19)	-17.01*** (1.38)
Feature	0.91*** (0.14)	0.75*** (0.21)	-0.11 (0.14)
Display	0.49*** (0.14)	0.32 (0.21)	0.07 (0.14)
Inventory	-3.22*** (0.50)	-1.10*** (0.29)	-0.16 (0.28)
State Dependence	0.61*** (0.21)	1.42*** (0.18)	1.24*** (0.19)
<i>Control functions</i>			
Price Residual (Heinz 32)	0.53*** (0.20)	-0.01 (0.27)	-0.43 (0.32)
Price Residual (Hunt's 32)	0.32 (0.56)	0.03 (0.56)	1.97*** (0.43)
Price Residual (Heinz 28)	-0.19 (0.29)	0.09 (0.17)	0.10 (0.27)
Price Residual (SB 32)	0.35 (0.42)	1.81*** (0.47)	1.13*** (0.29)

*** p < 0.01

Table 4: Mean Price Elasticities for the 3 Segment Model

<i>Change in Price</i>	<i>Change in Share</i>			
	Heinz 32	Hunt's 32	Heinz 28	SB 32
Heinz 32	-3.61	0.11	0.07	0.13
Hunt's 32	0.04	-5.39	0.05	0.13
Heinz 28	0.06	0.09	-2.75	0.06
Store Brand 32	0.07	0.16	0.03	-4.06

Table 5: Cost Equation Estimates

Parameter	Estimate (Std Err)
Heinz 32 oz	0.052 (0.072)
Hunt's 32 oz	0.11 (0.072)
Heinz 28 oz	0.062 (0.073)
SB 32 oz	0.046 (0.072)
Tomatoes	0.140*** (0.063)

*** p < 0.01

Table 6: Incremental Profits from Personalized Coupons

	<u>Last Visit Based</u> \$ Profits (% increase over 'no firm targets' scenario)		<u>Last Purchase Based</u> \$ Profits (% increase over 'no firm targets' scenario)		<u>Full History Based</u> \$ Profits (% increase over 'no firm targets' scenario)	
	Heinz profits	Hunt's profits	Heinz profits	Hunt's profits	Heinz profits	Hunt's profits
No firm targets	80,947	4,915	80,947	4,915	80,947	4,915
Hunt's only targets	80,947 (0%)	4,915 (0%)	80,968 (0.03%)	4,956 (0.83%)	80,926 (-0.03%)	4,979 (1.31%)
Heinz only targets	80,961 (0.02%)	4,915 (0%)	81,071 (0.15%)	4,930 (0.31%)	82,522 (1.95%)	4,932 (0.34%)
Both firms target	80,961 (0.02%)	4,915 (0%)	81,047 (0.12%)	4,950 (0.7%)	82,537 (1.96%)	4,976 (1.24%)

Table 7: Accuracy in Computing Targeting Profits

	Heinz profits (\$)	Hunt's profits (\$)
No firm targets (aggregate behavior)	76665	4,794
No firm targets (true individual behavior)	80,947	4,915
	(5.58%)	(2.52%)
Both firms target (last visit)	80,961	4,915
	(5.60%)	(2.52%)
Both firms target (last purchase)	81,047	4,950
	(5.72%)	(3.25%)
Both firms target (full history)	82,537	4,976
	(7.66%)	(3.79%)

Table 8: Effect of Personalized Coupons on Shares, Margins and Category Purchase

	<u>Both target using full history</u>	
	Heinz	Hunt's
Average increase in share	Hz 32: -0.3% Hz 28: +0.5%	Ht 32: +3.6%
Increase in (share weighted) margins	Hz 32: +3.0% Hz 28: +0.6%	Ht 32: +1.2%
Average increase in category purchase	+0.4%	
	<u>Only Heinz targets using full history</u>	
	Heinz	Hunt's
Average increase in share	Hz 32: -0.3% Hz 28: +0.4%	Ht 32: +0.3%
Increase in (share weighted) margins	Hz 32: +3.0% Hz 28: +0.5%	Ht 32: +0.4%
Average increase in category purchase	+0.1%	
	<u>Only Hunt's targets using full history</u>	
	Heinz	Hunt's
Average increase in share	Hz 32: -0.0% Hz 28: +0.1%	Ht 32: +3.7%
Increase in (share weighted) margins	Hz 32: -0.1% Hz 28: +0.0%	Ht 32: +1.2%
Average increase in category purchase	+0.4%	

Table 9: Price and Personalization Vendor Profits under Alternative Personalization Scenarios

	<u>Last Visit Based Targeting</u>			<u>Full History Based Targeting</u>		
	\$			\$		
	Price for Heinz	Price for Hunt's	Total Profits	Price for Heinz	Price for Hunt's	Total Profits
No firm targets	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hunt's only targets	0	0	0	0	48	48
Heinz only targets	14	0	14	1596	0	1596
Both firms target	14	0	14	1611	44	1655

Table 10: Incremental Retailer Profits from Personalization

	<u>Full History Based Targeting</u>		
	\$		
	Profits from Ketchup Profits	Profits from Personalization Service	Total Retailer Profits
No firm targets	0	0	0
Hunt's only targets	1111	48	1159
Heinz only targets	110	1596	1706
Both firms target	1291	1655	2946

Table 11: Profits with Alternative Retailer Markup Strategies

<i>Retailer charges optimal markup</i>	Heinz	Hunt's	Retailer
Profits with no targeting (\$)	80,947	4,915	364,630
% profit increase from targeting by both firms (full history)	1.96%	1.24%	0.35%
<i>Retailer charges constant markup (25%)</i>	Heinz	Hunt's	Retailer
Profits with no targeting (\$)	122,059	4,544	300,973
% profit increase from targeting by both firms (full history)	10.91%	1.50%	3.10%

Appendix

A. The Pricing Equations

Retailer

From (4), the retailer's optimization problem is as follows.

$$\max_{r_1^{xy}, \dots, r_J^{xy}} \Pi_{Rt}^{xy} = \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{i=1}^{N_i} (r_{jt}^{xy} - w_{jt}^{xy}) \sum_{k=1}^K f^k S_{ijt}^k (r_{jt}^{xy} - D_{ijt}^{xy}) \quad (\text{A1})$$

For the purposes of the derivation, we drop the superscripts x and y indicating whether a manufacturer bought targeting services and the subscript t that indexes time-period for clarity. These can be included appropriately into the final wholesale and retail margins. Hence the retailer objective is:

$$\max_{r_1, \dots, r_J} \Pi_R = \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{i=1}^N (r_j - w_j) \sum_{k=1}^K f^k S_{ij}^k (r_j - D_{ij})$$

Taking the derivative of the objective function with respect to the retail prices, the following first order condition for each product j is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \left(\sum_{m=1}^J (r_j - w_j) \frac{\partial S_{ij}(r_m - D_{ij})}{\partial r_j} + \sum_{k=1}^K f^k S_{ij}^k (r_m - D_{ij}) \right) = 0 \quad (\text{A2})$$

where w_j is the wholesale price charged by manufacturer to the retailer for brand j .

Define Θ_R^i as the the first derivatives of all the (individual consumers') shares with respect to all retail prices (retail prices are common across consumers), with element $(j,m) = \frac{\partial S_{im}(r_m)}{\partial r_j}$.

The retailer first order conditions can then be written in matrix form as:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \left[\Theta_R^i (R - W) + S^i \right] = 0$$

where R is the vector of retail prices and W is the vector of wholesale prices (which are common across all consumers) and S^i is the vector of shares for each consumer ' i ' over all the brands:

$$R \equiv \begin{bmatrix} r_1 \\ \vdots \\ r_J \end{bmatrix}_{J \times 1}, \quad W \equiv \begin{bmatrix} w_1 \\ \vdots \\ w_J \end{bmatrix}_{J \times 1}, \quad S^i \equiv \begin{bmatrix} S_1^i \\ \vdots \\ S_J^i \end{bmatrix}_{J \times 1}$$

The vector of retail margins $(R - W)$ is obtained by inverting the above matrix equation:

$$R - W = - \underbrace{\left(\sum_{i=1}^N \Theta_{iR} \right)^{-1} * \left(\sum_{i=1}^N S_i \right)}_{\text{Retail Margin}} \quad (\text{A3})$$

where the shares are:

$$S_i \equiv \sum_{k=1}^K f^k S_i^k \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \sum_{k=1}^K f^k S_{i1}^k \\ \vdots \\ \sum_{k=1}^K f^k S_{iJ}^k \end{bmatrix}_{J \times 1}$$

and the individual specific share derivative matrix with respect to retailer prices is:

$$\Theta_{iR} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial S_{i1}}{\partial p_1} & \frac{\partial S_{i2}}{\partial p_1} & \dots & \frac{\partial S_{iJ}}{\partial p_1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial S_{i1}}{\partial p_J} & \frac{\partial S_{i2}}{\partial p_J} & \dots & \frac{\partial S_{iJ}}{\partial p_J} \end{bmatrix}_{J \times J} \quad (\text{A4})$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \sum_{k=1}^K f^k [\alpha S_{i1}^k (1 - S_{i1}^k)] & \sum_{k=1}^K f^k [-\alpha S_{i1}^k S_{i2}^k] & \dots & \sum_{k=1}^K f^k [-\alpha S_{i1}^k S_{iJ}^k] \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \sum_{k=1}^K f^k [-\alpha S_{iJ}^k S_{i1}^k] & \sum_{k=1}^K f^k [-\alpha S_{iJ}^k S_{i2}^k] & \dots & \sum_{k=1}^K f^k [\alpha S_{iJ}^k (1 - S_{iJ}^k)] \end{bmatrix}_{J \times J}$$

Therefore the retail price is given by

$$R = W - \left(\sum_{i=1}^N \Theta_{iR} \right)^{-1} * \left(\sum_{i=1}^N S_i \right) \quad (\text{A5})$$

Manufacturer

A manufacturer 'm' offering a subset \mathfrak{S}_m of brands in the market sets the wholesale price w_{jt}^{xy} (where $j \in \mathfrak{S}_m$) and the coupon face values to individual households (D_{ijt}^{xy}) so as to maximize the manufacturer's profits. A manufacturer who has not been sold the personalization service will have coupon face values set to zero. The manufacturer takes into account the knowledge that retailer prices (r_{jt}^{xy}) will be set taking into account the wholesale prices and the coupon face values that have been issued to individual households.

$$\Pi_{mt}^{xy} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_m} \sum_{i=1}^{N_i} (w_{jt}^{xy} - D_{ijt}^{xy} - c_{jt}) S_{ijt}^{xy} (r_{jt}^{xy} (w_{jt}^{xy}, D_{ijt}^{xy}) - D_{ijt}^{xy}) \quad (\text{A6})$$

where c_{jt} is the marginal cost of the manufacturer for brand j in period t , and $S_{ijt}^{xy} (r_{jt}^{xy} (w_{jt}^{xy}, D_{ijt}^{xy}) - D_{ijt}^{xy})$ is the probability of household i , buying brand j in period t given the decisions of manufacturers 1 (denoted by x) and 2 (denoted by y) to purchase the purchase history data. We present the first order conditions for the manufacturer dropping the x, y superscripts and the ' t ' subscript and writing retail price as r_j (not as $r_j(w_j, D_{ij})$) for clarity.

We write $w_{ij} = w_j - D_{ij}$ since the manufacturer sets both the wholesale price and the individual coupon face values to maximize profit. As discussed earlier, even though the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and Catalina sets the coupon face value, analytically it does not matter whether we make this distinction. The first order condition with respect to w_{ij} is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \left[\sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_m} \left\{ (w_{ij} - c_j) * \frac{dS_{ij}(r_j - D_{ij})}{dw_{ij}} + S_{ij}(r_j - D_{ij}) \right\} \right] = 0 \quad (\text{A7})$$

Define Θ_W^i for each individual consumer such that it contains the first derivatives of all the (individual consumers') shares with respect to all wholesale prices (wholesale prices are common across consumers), with element $(j,m) = \frac{\partial S_{im}(r_m - D_{im})}{\partial w_{ij}}$. To account for the set of brands owned by the same manufacturer, define the manufacturer's ownership matrix O_W such that element (j,m) is equal to one if the manufacturer who sells brand j also sells brand m , and zero otherwise. The manufacturer's first order condition can then be written in matrix form as:

$$\sum_{i=1}^N [(O_W \bullet \Theta_W^i)(W_i - C) + S^i] = 0 \quad (\text{A8})$$

where $(O_W \bullet \Theta_W^i)$ is the element by element multiplication of the two matrices, W_i is the vector of wholesale prices less the individual coupon values, C is the vector of marginal costs of the manufacturer (C is common across all consumers), and S^i is the vector of shares for each consumer i :

$$W_i = \begin{bmatrix} w_1 - D_{i1} \\ \vdots \\ w_J - D_{iJ} \end{bmatrix}_{J \times 1}, \quad C = \begin{bmatrix} c_1 \\ \vdots \\ c_J \end{bmatrix}_{J \times 1}, \quad S_i = \begin{bmatrix} S_{i1} \\ \vdots \\ S_{iJ} \end{bmatrix}_{J \times 1}$$

From the manufacturer first order conditions, we can write the manufacturer margin from a particular household i ($W_i - C$) as follows:

$$(W_i - C) = (O_W \bullet \Theta_W^i)^{-1} * (-S^i) \quad (\text{A9})$$

The share derivatives with respect to wholesale matrix Θ_W^i need to be calculated. As mentioned earlier, the manufacturer response matrix has the elements $(j,m) = \frac{\partial S_{im}(r_m - D_{im})}{\partial w_{ij}}$.

Define the matrix of derivatives of all retail prices to all wholesale prices (for consumer ' i ') as Δ_{rw}^i , with the element $(j,x) = \frac{dr_x(W)}{dw_j}$. Then Θ_W^i can be re-written as:

$$\Theta_W^i = \Delta_{rw}^i \Theta_R^i \quad (\text{A10})$$

In the Manufacturer Stackelberg game, manufacturers anticipate how the retailer will respond to changes in wholesale prices and use these reactions when setting wholesale prices.

We can solve for the retail reactions $\frac{dr_x(W)}{dw_j}$ by taking the total derivative of the retailer's first

order condition with respect to the retail price r_j and the wholesale price w_j :

$$\Psi_W^i * \begin{bmatrix} \frac{dr_1}{dw_1} & \frac{dr_1}{dw_2} & \dots & \frac{dr_1}{dw_J} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{dr_J}{dw_1} & \frac{dr_J}{dw_2} & \dots & \frac{dr_J}{dw_J} \end{bmatrix}_{J \times J} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial S_1^i}{\partial r_1} & \frac{\partial S_2^i}{\partial r_1} & \dots & \frac{\partial S_J^i}{\partial r_1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial S_1^i}{\partial r_J} & \frac{\partial S_2^i}{\partial r_J} & \dots & \frac{\partial S_J^i}{\partial r_J} \end{bmatrix}_{J \times J}$$

where

$$\Psi_W^i = \begin{bmatrix} 2 \frac{\partial S_1^i}{\partial r_1} + \sum_{m=1}^J (r_m - w_m) \frac{\partial^2 S_m^i}{\partial r_1^2} & \dots & \frac{\partial S_J^i}{\partial r_1} + \frac{\partial S_1^i}{\partial r_J} + \sum_{m=1}^J (r_m - w_m) \frac{\partial^2 S_m^i}{\partial r_J \partial r_1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial S_1^i}{\partial r_J} + \frac{\partial S_J^i}{\partial r_1} + \sum_{m=1}^J (r_m - w_m) \frac{\partial^2 S_m^i}{\partial r_1 \partial r_J} & \dots & 2 \frac{\partial S_J^i}{\partial r_J} + \sum_{m=1}^J (r_m - w_m) \frac{\partial^2 S_m^i}{\partial r_J^2} \end{bmatrix}_{J \times J} \quad (\text{A11})$$

The second derivatives are obtained for these relationships of a,b,c (where there is an equality sign, the index a will be preferred to c or b if a is in the equality, and b will be preferred to c if b is in the equality). :

$$\frac{\partial^2 S_a^i}{\partial r_c \partial r_b} = \begin{cases} \alpha^2 * S_a^i * (1 - S_a^i) * (1 - 2 * S_a^i) & a = c = b \\ 2 * \alpha^2 * S_a^i * S_b^i * S_c^i & a \neq c \neq b \\ \alpha^2 * S_a^i * S_b^i * (2 * S_a^i - 1) & a = c \neq b \\ \alpha^2 * S_a^i * S_c^i * (2 * S_a^i - 1) & a = b \neq c \\ \alpha^2 * S_a^i * S_b^i * (2 * S_b^i - 1) & a \neq c = b \end{cases} \quad (A12)$$

Writing the total derivative of the retailer's first order condition in matrix form:

$$\Psi_W^i * (\Delta_{rW}^i)^T = \Theta_R^i$$

where $(\Delta_{rW}^i)^T$ is the transpose of the matrix Δ_{rW}^i . Therefore Δ_{rW}^i is obtained as:

$$\Delta_{rW}^i = \left[(\Psi_W^i)^{-1} * \Theta_R^i \right]^T \quad (A13)$$

The wholesale price to the retailer is given by $w_j = \max_i w_{ij}$ and the individual specific discount is given by $D_{ij} = w_{jt} - w_{ij}$.

B. Endogeneity Correction

We correct for price endogeneity using the control function approach developed in Petrin and Train (2004). The 'control function' approach (Hausman 1978) uses extra variables to control for the part of the unobserved component of demand that is correlated with price. In principle, the control functions are constructed using as arguments the differences between observed prices and the predicted prices which are arrived at using all the relevant demand and supply variables observed by the econometrician.

Consider the utility equation:

$$u_{ijt} = X_{ijt} \beta - r_{jt} \alpha + \xi_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (B1)$$

and rewrite it incorporating the control function as:

$$u_{ijt} = X_{ijt} \beta - r_{jt} \alpha + f(\mu_{jt}; \omega) + (\xi_{jt} - f(\mu_{jt}; \omega)) + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (B2)$$

where $f(\mu_{jt}; \omega)$ is the function that controls for the correlation of the unobserved component ξ_{jt} with the price r_{jt} , μ_{jt} are control variables used in such a correction, and ω are the coefficients for μ_{jt} . Let the redefined unobserved component be $\eta_{jt} = (\xi_{jt} - f(\mu_{jt}; \omega))$. If the function $f(\mu_{jt}; \omega)$ could be constructed and added to the utility function, it is clear from equation (B2) that the resulting random component $\eta_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$ would no longer be correlated with price (by construction), and the estimates obtained would be corrected for price endogeneity. Petrin and Train (2004) show that (under a wide range of conditions) the control function $f(\mu_{jt}; \omega)$ is linear in the price residuals of a regression of price on its primitives. In our context, we estimate a regression of prices against factor costs as follows:

$$r = \kappa_j + \zeta * B_t + \mu_{jt}$$

where B_t are the factor prices, κ_j are brand specific intercepts and μ_{jt} are the residuals from this regression. Thus $f(\mu_{jt}; \omega) = \omega \mu_{jt}$, and we write equation (B2) as :

$$u_{ijt} = X_{ijt} \beta - r_{jt} \alpha + \omega \mu_{jt} + \eta_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (\text{B3})$$

This utility equation (B3) is used in estimating the latent class model rather than equation (1) of the text to perform the endogeneity correction. Different specifications can be used for ω (Petrin and Train 2004 pages 25-26), and we present the results where ω is segment-specific, i.e., $[\omega_k]_{k=1}^K$.